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AMERICA FIRST? HOW TO TAKE A BALANCED APPROACH  
TO REFORMING THE ISDS PROVISION IN NAFTA 
By 
Robert J Gross Jr.* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
With the election of President Donald J. Trump and his policy of “America First,”  the 
Trump Administration has either re-evaluated or withdrawn from many of the United 
States’ commitments abroad.1 One example garnering ongoing media attention is the 
renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).2 NAFTA 
positively impacted the United States’ economy, including increasing trade from $297 
billion US to $1.17 trillion US between The United States of America, Canada, and Mexico 
from 1992-2017, lowering consumer prices due to lower tariffs, and increasing foreign 
direct investment from Canada and Mexico.3 While NAFTA has several positive aspects, 
President Trump’s views on NAFTA may be influenced by the negative impact NAFTA 
has had on United States’ manufacturing and President Trump’s supporters.4 If the Trump 
Administration plans to proceed in the renegotiation of NAFTA or if Congress rejects the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement,5 one possible amendment could be the addition 
of procedural safeguards, based on the Canadian-European Union Comprehensive 
 
* Robert J Gross Jr. was a 2017-2018 Senior Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2019 Juris Doctor 
candidate at Penn State Law. 
1 See Oren Dorell, Trumps Foreign Policy Often Puts ‘America First’ and Alone, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2018, 
1:26 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/01/19/trumps-foreign-policy-often-put-
america-first-and-alone/1036558001/ (Examples of this shift include the withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran). 
2 Id.; see also President Donald J. Trump is Keeping His Promise to Renegotiate NAFTA, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-keeping-
promise-renegotiate-nafta/?utm_source=link&utm_medium=header. 
3 Kimberly Amadeo, Six Advantages of NAFTA: The Hidden Benefits of NAFTA, THE BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/advantages-of-nafta-3306271. 
4 See Jacqueline Granados, Article, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment Under NAFTA Chapter 11: 
Prospects for the Western Hemisphere Under Chapter 17 of the FTAA, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
189, 195 (2005); In a return to familiar topics, Trump threatens to terminate NAFTA and insists Mexico will 
pay for the border wall, LA TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017, 4:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-
updates-trump-tweets-nafta-renegotiation-htmlstory.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 




Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”),6 to protect State sovereignty from foreign 
investors. 
This paper explores whether the Trump Administration should continue weakening the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) provision found within Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA.7 Specifically, this paper argues that the ISDS provisions in NAFTA should be 
altered and modeled after the CETA example. Part II explores the history of NAFTA, and 
Part III discusses the ISDS provisions. Part IV then analyzes Mobil Investments Canada & 
Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada (“Mobil v. Canada”), an International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)8 case. Mobil v. Canada exemplifies ISDS arbitration 
and underscores the main concern with the future of ISDS arbitration in NAFTA, namely, 
investor’s unprecedented ability to affect regulatory regimes and affect State sovereignty.  
Part V explores the different arguments in support of and against ISDS arbitration in 
NAFTA and presents an alternative to the ISDS provision that may bridge the gap between 
Anti- and Pro-ISDS advocates. 
II.   NEGOTIATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
In August 1992, approximately a year of negotiations between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico (collectively “the Signatory States”) concluded in Washington, D.C.9  
Although the negotiations began in June 1991, the process was onerous for the Signatory 
States because it took a long time for the Signatory States to take the discussions seriously 
and offer concessions to one another.10   
In December 1991, the three parties met in Dallas, Texas to formally agree on the 
NAFTA’s provisions.11 The Signatory States focused their efforts on the least contentious 
provisions and agreed to officially negotiate hotly-contested terms at a later period.12  
While the least contentious provisions helped negotiations gain momentum, that 
 
6 Canadian-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016, 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. 
7 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 1992 WL 812394, *1 (1993); 
See NAFTA Secretariat, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/North-American-
Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=539c50ef-51c1-489b-808b-9e20c9872d25#A1101 (hereinafter 
“NAFTA”). 
8 See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/.  
9 Jennifer A Heindl, Article, Toward a History of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 672, 
679 (2006) (hereinafter “Heindl”). 
10 Id.  




momentum did not last long.13 Negotiations stalled because Canada wished to keep the 
provisions of NAFTA close to the terms of the previous Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (“CUSFTA”), and because Mexico objected to adding expropriation clauses to 
the agreement.14   
A.   Canada’s Issue with NAFTA 
Canada feared that a new free trade agreement would shift the economic status quo 
between the United States and Canada.15 Prior to NAFTA, Canada and the United States 
had previously negotiated a free trade agreement which went into effect in 1989: 
CUSFTA.16 Prior to CUSFTA, and continuing through NAFTA negotiations, the Canadian 
government was reluctant to enter into a trade agreement with the United States, fearing 
economic supremacy by the United States.17 After CUSFTA was in effect, Mexico entered 
into trade negotiations with the United States and functionally forced Canada to enter into 
the NAFTA negotiations.18 In the negotiation process, Canada remained reluctant to agree 
to the new treaty.19 Canada objected to many of NAFTA’s provisions, which it deemed 
substantially different from the provisions in CUSFTA.20 For example, in CUSFTA, 
Canada retained the right to review new foreign investments made in its territory.21  
Throughout the renegotiation process, Canada advocated zealously for the retention of the 
right for Canada to review these new investments.22 Canada’s advocacy eventually 
persuaded Mexico to join the plight, and the final version of NAFTA adopted the right to 
review new investments.23 Negotations moved forward. 
 
13 Heindl, supra note 9, at 680. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 676. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (Canada was forced back into negotiations, fearing falling economically behind Mexico and the United 
States). 
19 Heindl, supra note 9, at at 681. 
20 Id. at 680. 
21 Id. at 680-81.  
22 Id. 
23 See id. at 683. 
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B.   Mexico’s Issue with NAFTA 
Mexico took issue with the expropriation provision in NAFTA, which it deemed to be 
in conflict with the Mexican Constitution’s “Calvo Clause.”24 Prior to the enactment of 
NAFTA, Mexico’s Constitution included the Calvo Clause, which allowed the Mexican 
Government to expropriate foreign investors’ property to the State.25 During NAFTA 
negotiations, the United States proposed an expropriation clause that guaranteed the 
“prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation for any taking by the Mexican 
Government.26 However, such a clause would be in direct conflict with the Calvo Clause, 
which “establishe[d] that no foreigner c[ould] have more rights than a Mexican, including 
rights of protection against expropriation.”27 The Mexican government owned all natural 
resources on their land.28 The Calvo Clause also established that foreign investors could 
not seek assistance from their home nations when suing the Mexican government for 
expropriations.29 United States’ proposed expropriation clause was unconstitutional under 
the Calvo Clause, because it would give foreign investors greater rights than Mexican 
citizens.30 After numerous negotiations, Mexico and the United States eventually 
substituted “prompt, adequate, and effective” with “fair market value,” which allowed the 
negotiations to proceed.31  
III. THE ISDS PROVISIONS WITHIN NAFTA 
A.   Chapter 11 Section A: Substantive Prohibitions and Protections 
Section A of Chapter 11 details the substantive prohibitions applicable to the Signatory 
States and the substantive protections for foreign investors.32 Section A of NAFTA applies: 
(1) when one State’s regulations affect investors of another State; (2) to investments of 
individual investors of another State; and (3) to all investments in the State, if sections 1106 
 
24 Heindl, supra note 9, at 683. 
25 Id. at 863; Expropriation is the “governmental taking or modification of an individual’s property rights, 
[especially] by eminent domain.” Expropriation, BLACK’S LAW Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
26 See Heindl, supra note 9, at 681. 
27 Id. at 678. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 681. 
31 Id. at 682. 
32 See NAFTA, supra note 7, at *1. 
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or 1114 apply.33 Substantively, the ISDS provisions prohibit a State from favoring 
domestic investors over foreign investors.34 In addition, a State cannot favor a foreign 
investor of one of the Signatory States over an investor from another Signatory State.35 For 
example, Canada cannot give preferential treatment to Mexican foreign investors over 
foreign investors from the United States. A second substantive provision states that a 
Signatory State cannot adopt regulations that require an investor take certain actions, 
including, but not limited to, mandating the amount of goods and services to export, forcing 
the investor to purchase manufactured goods from the Signatory State, or acting as the 
exclusive provider of goods and services.”36 States also cannot place conditions on 
investment, within their territories, to achieve a percentage of domestic content, to require 
the purchase or use of goods in their territories, relate the volume of imports to the volume 
of exports, or restrict the sale of goods within their territories.37  Finally, a Signatory State 
may expropriate an investor’s property only for a non-discriminatory public purpose, in 
accordance to due process rights, and must compensate the investor at fair-market value.38  
B.   Chapter 11, Section B: Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Chapter 11, Section B defines NAFTA’s dispute resolution mechanism, which 
arguably has pitfalls that allow investors suing a state to circumvent the State’s governance 
scheme and to infringe on a State’s sovereignty. The goal of the dispute resolution 
mechanism in NAFTA is to provide equal treatment for all parties and to create parity 
across the Signatory State’s laws.39 When a dispute arises, the parties must negotiate before 
submitting a claim to arbitration.40 Additionally, the aggrieved party must wait six months, 
from the time that the claim arose, before submitting their claim to arbitration.41   
Section B allows the aggrieved party to submit his or her claims in three separate 
manners.42 The aggrieved party can choose ICSID as the forum for the arbitration, ad-hoc 
arbitration using the ICSID rules, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
 
33 NAFTA, supra note 7, at *1. 
34 See id. at *1. 
35 Id. at *1-2. 
36 See id. at *2-3. 
37 See id. at *2-3. 
38 Id. at *6-7.  
39 NAFTA, supra note 7, at *7. 





(“UNCITRAL”) tribunals.43 Chapter 11 also states that three arbitrators are the default 
configuration of the tribunal – each party selects one arbitrator, and then the parties’ 
arbitrators mutually select a president arbitrator.44 If the arbitral tribunal has not been 
constituted within ninety days from the initiation of the claim, the ICSID’s Secretary-
General appoints the arbitrators, but, due to NAFTA rules, the Secretary-General cannot 
appoint the president arbitrator.45 
When a final award is rendered, the tribunal may award money damages and 
restitution.46 The award rendered will have no effect on parties not subject to the 
arbitration.47 After an award is rendered, a party cannot seek enforcement until 120 days 
have elapsed and no party has requested annulment or a revision.48 Notably absent from 
this dispute resolution mechanism is any ability to stop claims from proceeding in court 
and through arbitration, any semi-permanent members of an arbital tribunal who are 
familiar with NAFTA specific provisions and issues, or any right to appeal of substantive 
issues. 
IV. EXEMPLIFYING THE ISSUES WITH THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM: 
CIRCUMVENTING STATES’ GOVERNANCE AND INFRINGING ON STATES’ SOVEREIGNTY 
A.   Using NAFTA’s Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Mobil’s Case 
In Mobil Investments Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada (“Mobil v. Canada”), 
Mobil Investments Canada and Murphy Oil (collectively “Claimants”) sued Canada under 
the ISDS framework established in NAFTA’s Chapter 11.49 The dispute arose from the 
application of the Guidelines for Research and Development Expenditures adopted in 2004 
by the Canadian Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (“2004 
 
43 NAFTA, supra note 7, at *8; About UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Sep 9, 2018). 
44 Id. at *9. 
45 See id. at *9-10. 
46 Id. at *13. 
47 Id. at *13-14. 
48 Id. 
49 See Mobil Investments Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ¶ 1 (May 22, 2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1145.pdf (hereinafter “Mobil v. Canada”). 
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Guidelines”).50 The Claimants asserted that Canada violated Articles 1105,51 1106,52 and 
110853 of NAFTA’s Chapter 11.54 More specifically, the Claimants alleged that Canada 
“violated Article 1105 of NAFTA by ‘failing to provide a stable regulatory framework for 
the conduct of petroleum development projects in the Newfoundland offshore area and by 
frustrating Claimants’ legitimate expectations with regard to that regulatory 
framework.’”55 The Claimants alleged the Board violated Article 1106 by instituting a 
regulatory scheme that required performance on the part of the Claimants by requiring the 
Claimants to spenda minimum amount of money on Research and Development (“R&D”) 
and Education and Training (“E&T”) within the Providence, regardless of the Claimants’ 
need for that R&D.56 Finally, the Claimants alleged that this regulatory regime did not fall 
within the purview of Canada’s reservation under Article 1108. 57   
The Tribunal rejected the Claimants’ Article 1105 claims. The Tribunal held that the 
Board made no promises, “either expressly or by a pattern of behavior.”58 The Tribunal 
also found no provision in the Accord Acts limited the Board’s ability to implement a 
minimum amount of R&D expenditures that the Claimants had to meet.59 Finally, the 
Tribunal rejected the Claimants’ argument that the Benefits Plans constituted a contractual 
relationship to which the Board could not make material changes.60   
 
50 See Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶1. 
51 NAFTA, supra note 7, *2 (establishing the minimum standard of treatment required in relation to investors 
from other Signatory States. A party must afford foreign investors from Signatory States the minimum 
customary rights under international law.) 
52 Id. (outlining the prohibitions against a Signatory State requiring performance by a foreign investor.  More 
specifically, Mobil v. Canada dealt with Article 1106(1)(c) which states, “No Party may impose or enforce 
any of the following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of 
a Party or of a non-Party in its territory: . . .  to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or 
services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory.”) 
53 Id. (outlining when a Signatory State’s pre-existing non-conforming duty for foreign investors can be 
exempted from the requirements of NAFTA through reservation.) 
54 Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 111; Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 172; Mobil v. Canada, 
supra note 51, at ¶¶ 247-249 
55 Id. at ¶ 111. 
56 See id. at ¶ 172. 
57 See id. at ¶¶ 247-249. 
58 Id. at  ¶ 156. 
59 Id. at ¶ 159. 
60 Id. at ¶ 166. 
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The Tribunal ruled in favor of the Claimaints on their Article 1106 claim, holding that 
the 2004 Guidelines sufficiently forced the investor to perform.61 The Tribunal 
acknowledged Canada’s argument that there was no express reference to R&D or E&T 
within Article 1106.62 However, the Tribunal rejected Canada’s argument that R&D and 
E&T did not fall within the scope of the word “services.”63   
The Tribunal ruled in favor of Claimants on their Article 1108 claim. The Claimants 
asserted that the 2004 Guidelines were not consistent with Canada’s NAFTA reservations 
due to the Board’s post-2004 requirement that Claimants meet a certain threshold 
expenditure on R&D.64 The Tribunal reasoned that this policy change “amount[ed] to more 
than mere changes in the methodology, but in fact reflect[ed] a fundamentally different 
approach to compliance, compared to the Federal Accord Act and the Hibernia and Terra 
Nova Benefits Plans.”65 The Tribunal held that the 2004 Guidelines instituted “a different 
form of Board oversight than previously existed.”66 Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded 
that the 2004 Guidelines were inconsistent with the reservation.67 
On January 16, 2015, Mobil Investments Canada Inc. (“Mobil”), one of the collective 
Claimants in the prior arbitration, filed a subsequent Request for Arbitration.68  In Mobil’s 
request, they stated that the issue in dispute was the amount of damages owed to Mobil.69 
Mobil also argued that it is subject to ongoing damages due to the Board’s continued 
reliance on the 2004 Guidelines.70 Mobil requested a decision regarding damages in its 
favor, including damages, interest, taxes, and fees for commencing the arbitration.71 
 
61  Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 234. 
62 See id. at ¶ 215. 
63 See id. at ¶ 216. 
64 Id. at ¶¶ 393-95. 
65 Id. at ¶ 398. 
66 Id. at ¶ 404. 
67 Id. at ¶ 413. 
68 See Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
request for arbitration, *1, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/MobilRequestArbitrationREDACTED.pdf. 
69 Id. at ¶ 27. 
70 Id. at ¶ 49. 
71 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 




Additionally, the Canadian Superior Court of Justice dismissed Canada’s claim seeking to 
set aside the arbitral award.72 
B.   Mobil Exemplifies one of the Issues with the NAFTA’s Dispute Resolution 
Scheme 
Mobil v. Canada exemplies the ability for foreign investors to circumvent a State’s 
traditional legal system with little difficulty.73 In Mobil, the Canadian Court of Appeals 
rejected Mobil’s claims,74  but because of the ISDS provisions in NAFTA, the Claimants 
subsequently took their claims to arbitration.75 While the Canadian Court of Appeals found 
that the Board could require the Claimants to meet minimum levels in R&D within the 
Providence,76 the Tribunal found differently.77 Moreover, Canadian citizens had no 
recourse after the Tribunal’s decision, even though public funds paid Mobil for its lost 
profits awarded through arbitration.78 In essence, Mobil was not compelled to submit itself 
to Canada’s court system, given NAFTA’s alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 
Critics of the ISDS have voiced their concerns that NAFTA’s dispute resolution 
mechanism limits a State’s sovereignty. Consider Mobil v. Canada, in which Canada’s 
only recourse against the arbitral decision was to remove the guidelines or subject itself to 
repeated arbitrations from oil companies. In BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 
Chief Justice Roberts noted this same concern stating that with the alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism in place, ISDS arbitral tribunals have the ability to stand in judgment 
 
72 Attorney General of Canada v. Mobil et al., 2016 O.N.S.C. 790 (Can.), available at 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7160.pdf. 
73 See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at 
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf. 
74 Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 355; Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 86. 
75 Id. at ¶ 86. 
76 See id. at ¶ 86. 
77 Id. at ¶ 234; Id. at ¶ 398. 
78 See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute 




of a nation’s sovereign regulations.79 Canada, being the most sued country under ISDS 
provisions in the world and paying a total of $107 million as of 2015,80 would likely agree.  
V.   RENEGOTIATION OF NAFTA: THE CASE FOR AMERICA FIRST 
Arguing an America First stance, President Trump has pushed for seismic changes in 
how the United States approaches foreign policy.81 Examples of these changes include the 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the 
refusal to certify Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the 
repeated rebukes of the United States’ closest allies.82 Ben Rhodes, the Former National 
Security Advisor under President Obama, has described President Trump’s approach not 
as “taking aim at some of our legacy accomplishments, but [more of a] disavowal of an 
entire approach to the world.”83   
Against this backdrop, the Trump Administration hopes to weaken NAFTA,84 
including NAFTA’s ISDS provisions.85 While the Trump Administration is unsure about 
the best way to tackle ISDS, Mr. Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative, has 
stated that one option is to allow countries to opt-in to the ISDS provisions.86 This change 
would essentially allow countries to decide, on their own terms, whether they would be 
subject to the provisions of Chapter 11.87   
 
79 See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at 
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf 
80 Sunny Freedman, NAFTA's Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued Country Under Free Trade Tribunals, 
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/14/canada-sued-investor-state-dispute-
ccpa_n_6471460.html. 
81 See How does Obama’s Foreign Policy Look a Year Into Trump, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-does-barack-obama-foreign-policy-look-a-year-into-donald-trump-
presidency/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2018). 
82 See id. 
83 Id. 
84 See Trump Administration Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces (last visited Sep. 9, 2018). 




87 See Adam Behsudi, Investor Dispute Provision Still at Impasse Ahead of Washington Meeting, POLITICO 




A.   General Criticisms of the ISDS Arbitration Scheme  in NAFTA 
The Trump Administration’s goal in renegotiating NAFTA is to “support higher-
paying jobs in the United States and to grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. 
opportunities to trade with Canada and Mexico,”88 but he has received sharp criticisms 
from American corporations.89 In fact, several prominent business organizations, such as 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, delivered a letter to Mr. Lighthizer stating that “[a]ttempts 
to eliminate or weaken ISDS will harm American businesses and workers and, as a 
consequence, will serve to undermine business community support for the [NAFTA] 
moderni[z]ation negotiations.”90   
United States corporations have more than enough reasons to favor ISDS and its 
retention.91 United States investors rely heavily on NAFTA’s Chapter 11 when investing 
in Mexico.92 From 2014 to 2015, United States investors’ foreign direct investment in 
Mexico increased 1,003%, for a total of $15.7 billion.93 NAFTA disputes constitute a 
significant portion of the total amount of ICSID arbitrations, with United States investors 
constituting 138 of the total claimants.94   
Even though solid arguments for the retention of the ISDS provisions exist, such as 
protecting foreign investors and ensuring that other countries afford constitutional 
protections to investors when they do business in foreign countries,95 critics have 
continually pointed out the shortcoming with NAFTA’s Chapter 11. For example, in a 
letter, approximately 230 law professors and economics professors urged President Trump 
to remove ISDS from NAFTA and to not include an ISDS provision within the Trans-




90 Business Groups Fire Warning Shot Over NAFTA, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
https://www.ft.com/content/f8bd9e3c-88e3-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 (last visited Sep. 9, 2018). 
91 See Carlos Alverado, 200 Billion Reasons for Keeping Nafta, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 26, 
2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/26/200-billion-reasons-for-keeping-nafta/. 
92 See Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Catherine H. Gibson, ISDS and NAFTA – and ISDS Alternatives, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Nov. 29, 
2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/29/isds-in-nafta-and-isds-alternatives/. 
96 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement 




the problem with ISDS is that the provisions allow a private investor to circumvent the 
previously established mechanisms for dispute resolution, the domestic court systems.97   
The ability to sue a State directly is also an issue, because the ISDS provisions of 
NAFTA allows foreign investors to skirt the “the robust, nuanced, and democratically-
responsive U.S. legal framework.”98 Over the history of the United States, the United States 
citizenry has consistently refined the legal process, both from a procedural and an 
evidentiary standpoint, to make the process fair and consistent with the opinions of the 
American electorate.99 ISDS allows foreign investors to succeed in claims that would have 
otherwise been rejected by a Signatory State’s court system, because ISDS arbitrations lack 
some of the procedural and evidentiary safeguards found in traditional court 
proceedings.100 Some of the safeguards not included in the ISDS are the ability to enjoin 
domestic interests in the dispute resolution proceedings and an appeals process for mistakes 
of law.101 
Futhermore, ISDS reduces the administrative costs of moving operations to Canada or 
Mexico,102 which in turn, reduces the risk to American companies seeking to relocate their 
manufacturing overseas, because it reduces the potential costs associated with compliance 
of violations of foreign regulatory regimes.103 In a letter written to Mr. Lighthizer, the 
United States Trade Representative, Congressional members called on the Trump 
Administration to use an open process and renegotiate NAFTA in a way that helps 
American workers.104   
The United States investment in foreign manufacturing has consistently increased 
under NAFTA, while American manufacturing has stagnated.105 NAFTA significantly 
burdened the American worker’s bargaining power by strengthening United States 
corporations’ ability to lower workers’ wages by easing a corporation’s ability to move 







102 See Gibson, supra note 96. 
103 See Rosa L. DeLauro, et. al., Renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2017-0006-1396 (last 
viewed Feb. 24, 2018). 
104 See id. 
105 Rosa L. DeLauro, et. al., Renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2017-0006-1396 (last viewed Feb. 24, 2018). 




investment, allowing American companies to move their manufacturing to either Canada 
or Mexico, while still being able to sell their products effortlessly within the United 
States.107 NAFTA also gave United States companies the upper hand in wage negotiations, 
effectively permitting these companies to threaten moving their production out of the 
United States to reduce labor costs.108 The ISDS provisions of Chapter 11 shield these new 
benefits that hurt American workers, because it further reduces these costs by allowing 
foreign investors to directly sue the Signatory States for objectionable regulatory 
regimes.109 
B.   ISDS Alternatives: A Balanced-Approach to America First 
While there are many who believe ISDS is harmful to the United States economy, the 
issue remains: If the Signatory States remove the dispute resolution mechanism in NAFTA, 
what will replace it?110 One alternative, worth the attention of the Signatory States, is 
Canada’s proposal to base the new ISDS provision off their Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.111 CETA is a novel approach to deal with 
the ISDS issues, because CETA sets up a permanent arbitral tribunal for investment 
disputes.112 CETA resembles NAFTA in many respects, including its inclusion of 
substantive protections for investors, direct claims against signatory parties, and 
expropriation protection.113 However, CETA also provides additional safeguards in the 
dispute resolution process by creating an appeals process, a permanent tribunal with 
dedicated arbitrators, and the requirement for mediation.114   
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CETA has established a robust dispute resolution process. CETA established a 
permanent arbitral tribunal for the resolution of investment disputes,115 which consists 
consists of fifteen arbitrators – five from Canada, five from the European Union, and five 
arbitrators without a designated county affiliation.116 A CETA joint committee selects the 
arbitrators to five-year terms with a one-time option to renew their term.117 Arbitrators can 
finish any claims they started during their term, if the arbitration takes longer than their 
term.118 The President of the Tribunal decides which three arbitrators from the pool will 
hear the cases.119 Alternatively, the parties can agree that a dispute can be heard by one 
arbitrator.120 CETA further establishes an Appellate Tribunal to review awards within 
ninety days of the final decision.121 If a claimant decides an appeal is warranted, they have 
90 days, from the date of the decision, to initiate the appeal or else the decision becomes 
permanent.122 Finally, CETA requires mediation and negotiation, a 180-day cooling off 
period, disallowance of claims to proceed concurrently in a State’s court system and the 
arbitral tribunal, and transparency regarding the award.123 Much like NAFTA’s current 
Chapter 11, CETA allows the claimant to elect which rules to use in the arbitration, such 
as the UNCITRAL or ICSID rules.124 
This CETA dispute resolution system could be a substantial compromise between the 
two competing interests of State sovereignty, workers’ interests, and the interests of 
corporations in the NAFTA renegotiation debate.  Indeed, Canada and the European Union 
noted that the CETA’s ISDS provisions were designed to protect a nation’s ability to freely 
regulate industry within their counties, while retaining the benefits of free trade 
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Some argue that CETA will merely add delays to a system that is intended to be fast 
and efficient.127  While this is a valid concern due to the added procedural protections, other 
provisions found within CETA help expedite the arbitral process.128 One such provision is 
that the final award must be rendered within twenty-four months, and if the time limit needs 
to be extended, the tribunal must set out a statement of reasons for the delay.129 NAFTA 
does not appear to have a similar provision. The dispute resolution mechanism laid out in 
CETA would raise some of the costs on foreign investors in North America, while 
simultaneously retaining the substantive protections for which United States corporations 
are fighting. The administrative costs on companies pursuing foreign direct investment are 
increased by adding procedural safeguards for the Signatory States through the addition of 
an appellate procedure, removing the ad hoc nature of current ISDS tribunals with a semi-
permanent tribunal, and maintaining the substantive protections for corporations.   
Additionally, the CETA system allows for lawyers well-versed in international law and 
who have experience in the types of interntional investment issues typically presented at 
NAFTA tribunals to be appointed to the semi-permanent tribunal.130 The system would 
lead to more consistent results,131 and as a byproduct of due process, the revised ISDS 
provision would create a more palatable result for the Signatory States, foreign investors, 
and citizens of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The appellate review process is a 
significant departure from the ISDS provision in NAFTA and many other arbitration 
agreements.132 CETA allows for the review of both errors of law and errors of fact.133 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ISDS dispute resolution mechanism outlined in NAFTA merits revision. As 
exemplified in Mobil v. Canada, the ISDS provision facilitates investors ability to 
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circumvent a State’s regulatory scheme and infringe on a State’s sovereignty.134 At the 
same time, ISDS critics point to the negative repercussions to the American workers, even 
though corporations and the economy have benefited from NAFTA in general and the ISDS 
provision in specific.135 President Trump and the United States Congress still have an 
opportunity to bridge the divide by adopting a balanced-approach to President Trump’s 
America First approach, modeling a new dispute resolution provision in NAFTA after 
CETA.136  
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